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Abstract
Ferreira  and Leite  investigate whether  micr-o-siiMulation  simulationis  is based  on  a richer model  of behavior in  the
techniques  can shed light on  the types of policies that  labor markets.  It points to the  importanice of combining
should  be  adopted by countrics  wishiing to mcet  their  differenlt  policy  options, such  as educational  expansion
Millennium  Developmenlt  Goals. They compare  two  and targeted  conditionial  redistribution schemes,  to
families of micro-simulations. The first family of micro-  ensure that the poorest  people in  socicty  are successfully
simulations decomposes  required  poverty changes  into a  reached. But the absence  of market equilibria  in these
chanige  in the  meani  and  a reductioll  in  inequality.  statistical  models,  as well  as the  strong stability
Although  it  highlilghts the importance  of inequality  assumptiolIs  which are  implicit in  their  use, argue  for
reduction,  it appears  to be too general  to be  of muchl  usc  extrenile  caution  in their interpretation.
for policymaking.  The sccond  family of  micro-
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1.  Introduction
In September  2000, the member states of the United Nations unanimously  adopted  a
document  known  as  the Millennium  Declaration.  After  consultations  with  a number of
international  organizations  within the  UN system,  as well as the  RMF,  the World Bank
and the  OECD,  the General  Assembly  recognized  the  Millennium  Development  Goals
(MDG) as integral components of the implementation of that Declaration.  There are  eight
such  goals, each corresponding  to a key development  aim in one dimension  of human
welfare.  They are listed in  Table  1. Associated  with the eight  goals,  there  are eighteen
specific  targets, which quantify the broad goals in a measurable manner. Finally, there are
forty-eight  indicators in total, each of them  associated with a specific  target. These are
meant to be monitoring  variables,  through the evolution  of which progress  towards  the
goals  can  be  evaluated.  For  a  complete  listing  of goals,  targets  and  indicators,  see:
www.worldbank.org/mdci.
Table 1.  The Millennium Development  Goals
Goal  Title
1  Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger
2  Achieve Universal  Primary Education
3  Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women
4  Reduce  Child Mortality
5  Improve Maternal Health
6  Combat HIV/AIDS, rnalaria and other diseases
7  Ensure Environmental  Sustainability
8  Develop a Global Partnership  for Development
These  goals  and  their  associated  collection  of targets  and  indicators  have  already
succeeded,  to a  large extent, in at least one of their objectives,  namely raising awareness
of the  issues  which  they  seek  to  address  and  focusing  the  mind of policy-makers  -
national  and  international  - on the  need  to  secure  measurable  progress  along  various
dimensions  of human  welfare  in  a relatively  short period  of time:  most  targets  specify
objectives which should  be accomplished  no later than 2015.  As part of the effort,  some3
of the  multilateral  institutions  have  started  monitoring  programs,  which  compile  and
present  up-to-date  information  on  how  different  countries  and regions  are  doing  with
respect to each target.
Based on the results of these periodic  monitoring exercises,  questions  have begun to
be  asked in a number of countries  as to whether  this or that goal can in fact feasibly  be
reached by 2015. In some nations, debates  about policies to help meet some of the goals
have entered the political arena. Intemationally,  at least two UN agencies have teamed up
to  simulate  progress  and requirements  for  countries  to  meet  their  First  MDG  Target,
namely to halve the incidence of extreme poverty which prevailed in 1990, by 2015.3
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  modem  micro-simulation
techniques can  shed any light on some of the policy options available to countries  which
want to meet some of their Millennium  Development  Goals. Throughout  the article, we
argue  for  considerable  circumspection:  all of the simulations  we  present  are  essentially
statistical  exercises.  Although they differ in the extent to which agent behavior is taken
into  account,  none  of  them  is  based  on  models  where  prices  are  endogenously
determined, and thus none takes full account of market adjustments towards equilibrium,
or of subsequent  agent responses.
Nevertheless  we  argue  that,  subject  to  the  necessary  caution  and  humility,  some
valuable  lessons  can indeed  be learned  from micro-simulation-based  social  forecasting.
We apply our analysis to a single country - Brazil - and to three of the eight goals.  Table
2 lists the  five indicators  which  we  include  in this exercise.  The numbers  associated  to
them in the Table are their official numbers in the Millennium Development Goals.
Table 2.  Speciflc  MDG Indicators Considered in This Paper
Goal  1: Poverty and Hunger  1. Proportion of the population below $1 per day
2. Poverty gap ratio
Goal 2: Primary Education  6. Net enrollment  in primary education
Goal 3: Gender Equality  9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary
education.
11.  Ratio  of women to men  in wage  employment  in the
non-agricultural sector.
3This was a simulation exercise for Latin America, undertaken jointly by the UNDP and ECLAC,
alongside Brazil's  IPEA. See ECLAC and UNDP, forthcoming,  for a full report.4
The  paper  is  organized as  follows.  In the  next section we present  a simple "growth
and  inequality"  simulation,  which yields  all combinations of growth  rates and  "Lorenz-
convex" inequality reductions  which are statistically  consistent  with achieving the MDG
Target  1:  "Halving,  between  1990  and  2015,  the  proportion  of people  whose  income  is
less than one dollar a day". We then argue that., while some useful insights can be derived
from  this  exercise,  implications  for policy  are  necessarily  limited  by  the  behavioral
paucity  of the underlying  analysis.  Accordingly  we  turn,  in  Section  3, to  an approach
which is structurally richer, by virtue of taking into account observed patterns of behavior
with respect  to key  agent decisions,  such as  educational  attainment,  occupational  choice
and  earnings.  We  find  that  this  approach  generates  more  detailed  and  specific
counterfactuals, which may be useful in guiding policy interventions.  We warn, however,
that both the absence of endogenous price responses  in the model and the strength of the
assumptions  of behavioral  stability  which  are  maintained,  imply  that  the  simulation
results should not be understood  as predictions.
2.  Growth and Inequality: a Statistical Plerspective 4
The  first target  associated  with Millennium  Development  Goal  number  One  is that
countries should halve, between  1990 and 2015, the proportion of their population living
in  households  with per  capita  expenditure  or  income  levels  equal  to  or less  than  one
dollar  per  day,  measured  in  purchasing  power  parity  terms.  Since  this  is  a  poverty
reduction  target,  it  makes  sense  to  start  thinking  about  it  in  terms  of the two  basic
manners in which the extent of poverty in any given distribution can be reduced:  growth
in the mean and/or reduction in inequality.
A measure of poverty II in a given income  distribution F(y)  is always  defined  with
respect  to a poverty  line z,  which  separates  thie poor  from  the non-poor.  It is  therefore
always  the  case  that  poverty  is  a  functional  of the  distribution  of income  and  of the
poverty  threshold:  rI  = fl(F(y),  z).  As we just:  saw,  the Millennium  Poverty  Reduction
4 This section draws heavily on ECLAC and UNDP, forthcoming.  The methodology presented here was
developed originally for the preparation of that Report. Both authors were fortunate to work on the team
that prepared it, and are grateful to all other team members - especially Ricardo Paes de  'Barros - for their
guidance.5
Target  was  formulated  in  terms  of  the  poverty  incidence  indicator  Po,  so  that  this
functional  is simply Po = F(z).5
In  order to  consider  how economic  growth  and  changes  in inequality  contribute  to
changes  in the incidence  of poverty, Po, it is convenient  to draw on the established result6
that:
L'(p) = F1  (P)
,ay
where L'(p) denotes the first derivative of the Lorenz Curve:
Y(P)  P
L(p)=  - |  xf(x)dx=  -F-'(pYp
Y  O  AY  O
associated with the income distribution p = F(y).  It immediately follows that:
L' )=  F  (O)  =  Z
lIly  ily
Thus:
Po = L-  (z/JUy)
This  merely  states  that  the  incidence  of poverty  is  completely  determined  by  the
poverty line, the mean of the distribution, and its Lorenz Curve.7
This  is  useful  for our investigation  of reductions  in  extreme  poverty,  since  we can
simulate the effects  of economic  growth as  changes in mean  income (y)  and the effects
of inequality  as changes  in the Lorenz  Curve, L(p), which  is independent of the mean by
construction.  In particular,  for any poverty  incidence rate  P* < Po(F(y),  z),  there should
5  On the definition and properties of the Pa family,  see Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).
6See, e.g., Kakwani  (1980) and Deaton (1997).
7This fact has long been known, and indeed long been used to decompose observed changes  in poverty into
components due to  'growth' and  'inequality'. There is no single 'right' decomposition, and at least three
approaches have been proposed, namely those due to Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (1993)  and Tsui
(1996). See Ravallion (2000)  for a survey.  While the basic approach used in this Section falls squarely in
that tradition, it differs  in at least one respect:  since we are concerned with simulating the future - a form of
extrapolating out of sample - we construct and analyse sets of arbitrarily defined counterfactual
distributions,  rather than focusing on decomposing poverty changes between well-defined  specific actual
distributions.6
exist (a number of) hypothetical  distributions  F*, with mean level  gyt  and Lorenz curve
L*(p), which would have a poverty incidence cf  P* = L*H (z/l  *).
In particular,  consider a counterfactual  income distribution F*(y*), where:
(1)  y*' = (l+1)[(l-a)y + ajy],  withO<a< 1,P>O.
This transformation corresponds to a distribution-neutral  increase of [3%  in everyone's
income  level,  coupled  with  a  redistribution  policy  consisting  of taxing  lOOa%  of
everyone's income, and then distributing the revenues  equally across  every person  in the
population.
It is easy to see that the mean of the resulting counterfactual  distribution would be P%
higher than in the original distribution:
(2)  9Y*  = (l+P)py.
It  is  also  true  that  the  Lorenz  curve  of  the  new  distribution  would  be  thus
transformed:
(3)  L*(p) = (l-a)L(p)  + ap
And, consequently,  that the Gini coefficiernt  of the counterfactual  distribution would
be a% lower than that for the original distribution8:
(4)  G*(y) = (l-a)G(y).
Given  these properties, we refer to the two-parameter (a, P) class of transformations
of an income distribution,  which is given by (1), as Lorenz-convex  transformations. 9 This
is clearly  a  restrictive  set  of transformations,  but it  is analytically  convenient.  For this
reason,  they  have been  used  before  in  the  literature.  They underlie,  for  instance,  the
Kakwani (1993) decompositions.
The  values  of a  and  P can be  chosen  so  that  equations  (2)  and  (3) hold exactly,
satisfying P*  = L*'-'(z/pLy*).  The target poverty incidence rate P* can then be written as a
functional of the  original  income  distribution,  of the  relevant poverty  line,  and  of the
simulation parameters a and ,B:
(5)  P* = PO(a  , F(y), z)
8 See the Appendix for a proof.
9  Analogously,  we call any process that  leads from L(p) to L*(p),  defined as in (3), for 0 < a < 1,  a
"Lorenz-convex  inequality reduction".7
Since a and  f3  can be chosen independently,  there  is in fact one degree  of freedom in
the choice of simulation parameters.  In other words,  given an arbitrary  value of either a
or P (subject  to 0 < a <  1, p > 0),  there will exist  a (positive  or negative) value  of the
other  parameter  such  that  (5)  holds.  One  can  thus  define  an  isopoverty  set  for  the
distribution  F(y), for each  target poverty  incidence  P*, with respect to poverty  line z, as
the set of a, 1  pairs that would lead from F(y) to another distribution with poverty rate P*.
Formally:
(6)  I(P*, F(y), z) = {( a, 1)  Po(a, 1, F(y), z) = P*}
When  plotted  on  a, 13  space,  we  will  refer to  it  as the  P*  isopoverty  curve.  In the
specific case  of the MDG poverty reduction target, P*  is simply one half of the poverty
incidence rate Po which prevailed in the country in 1990.  In this case, any combination of
a rate of inequality  reduction  (a)  and a rate of economic  growth  (1) which belongs to I
will halve the  1990 incidence of poverty with respect to the extreme poverty line z.
Figure  1 below plots the isopoverty curve for the Brazilian Millennium  Development
Goal poverty  target,  which  is  defined  on the  basis  of the  poverty  incidence  estimated
from the  1990 national  household survey Pesquisa Nacional  por Amostra de Domicilios
(PNAD).1 0 Using a purchasing  power parity exchange  rate  and a thirty-days  month, the
international  U$1/day  poverty  line  was  converted  to  Brazilian  Reais  at  R$22.11  per
person per month,  in  1999 prices."  The proportion of the Brazilian population living in
households  with total per capita income  levels below that line in 1990  was 7.46%. This
implies that the MDG poverty reduction target for Brazil would be to reach an extreme
poverty incidence  of 3.73% by 2015.
'° The PNAD is  Brazil's  main nationally representative household  survey. It is fielded annually, except in
Census years (such as  199 1), and covers the entire country, except the rural areas  of the states of Acre,
Amapa,  Amazonas, Para, Rondonia and Roraima. Its sample size in 1990  (1999) was 72,084 (91,546)
households.  Although there is  no better data set for either 1990 or 1999 in  Brazil, see Ferreira, Lanjouw and
Neri (forthcoming) for a discussion of its shortcomings in measuring  incomes, particularly in  rural areas.
" The international "one-dollar  per person per day" poverty line,  which originated from the World Bank
Research  Department,  was originally used in  1990 and was expressed in 1985 prices.  The World Bank later
updated it  to U$1.08/day, in 1993 prices. To obtain the monthly poverty line in 1999 Brazilian Reais, we
computedz=U$1.08  * 30 * (I/PPP 93) * Brazil's CPI (September 1999, with base September  1993) = 32.4
* 56.1243 * 38.30 = 22.11.  The reader is  warned  that two of these numbers are measured with considerable
error: PPP exchange rates - which aim to calculate cost-of-living adjusted exchange rates across countries -
are based on a necessarily incomplete survey of product and service prices. Additionally, Brazilian inflation
rates were very high in 1993, so that the choice of base month in  that year  (i.e. the precise point in time for
which the PPP exchange rates were valid) matters considerably  for the final  1999 poverty line. Our choice
of September 1999 (the PNAD reference  month) implies a lower poverty line than using an average CPI for
1993  (as reflected in the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2002) figure for 1998).8
Figure  1 plots  the  combination  of cumulative  rates  of growth  in  mean  per  capita
incomes  from  1990  to  2015  (J,  on  the  horizontal  axis)  and  the  cumulative  rates  of
Lorenz-convex  inequality  reduction  (aL,  on  the vertical  axis)  which  would  achieve  that
target. Table  3 isolates three  specific points, for analysis.  The first of these is the vertical
intercept of the isopoverty curve.  It tells us  that one way to halve the poverty incidence
prevailing  in 1990 would be to rely exclusively on inequality reduction: with zero growth
in mean incomes, the poverty reduction target would be reached with a 3.4%  cumulative
decline  in the Gini coefficient  (through a Lorenz-convex  shift of the  Lorenz curve).This
would  imply  a  fall  in  the  Gini  coefficient  from  0.61  to  0.59.  Alternatively,  the  same
poverty  incidence  (3.7 1%)  could  be  reached  with  no movement  in  the  Lorenz  curve,
through  an  accumulated  per  capita  growth  rate of 50%  - corresponding  to  an  average
annual rate of 1.64%  over the 25-year period - at the horizontal intercept of the curve.
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In  between  these  "pure  strategies",  there  lies  a  continuum  of  combinations  of
inequality  reductions  and  accumulated  rates  of economic  growth  which  would  be
consistent with halving Brazil's  1990 poverty incidence.  One such point, which might be
of interest, is the one arising from the historical performance of the country between  1990
and  1999.  Over these nine  years, Brazil's mean income in the PNAD grew at an average9
annual  rate of 1.02%, and the Gini coefficient fell at an average annual rate of 0.43%. As
the  last row in  Table  3 indicates,  had this decline in the  Gini been attained through a
Lorenz-convex  inequality reduction, this  pattern  would  have  led  to  a  halving  of the
incidence of poverty in just under seven years. With a cumulative growth in mean income
of 7.35%  and a Lorenz-convex  fall in inequality of 2.94% (which corresponds to less than
two  points of the  Gini),  the Brazilian  extreme  poverty headcount would  have  fallen to
3.38%, by 1997.
Table 3: Three points on Brazil's MDG Isopoverty Curve
Growth (P%)  Inequality Reduction (a%)  ji  Headcount  Gini
1990  232.66  7A6%  0.6119
1999  9.56  3.74  254.90  5.29%  0.5889
2015*  0  3.40  232.66  3.71%  0.5911
50  0.00  348.99  3.71%  0.6119
Historical  per year (P=1.02%;ao=0.43%):
1997*  7.35  2.94  249.77  3.38%  0.5939
Sourm:  PNAD/IBGE  1990, PNAD/IBGE  1999  and author's calculation
Notes: z = RS22.11 per person per  month, in  1999 valus, which coresponds  to USI/person/day.
*Denotes simulated distributions.
Yet, the actual observed incidence of extreme poverty in 1999 was 5.29%, despite the
fact that accumulated growth in the PNAD mean income since  1990 was actually 9.56%,
and that the 1999 Gini coefficient was 3.74% smaller than in 1990. How can this be? It is
simply  an  indication  that  the  reduction  in the  Gini  coefficient  was  not the  result  of a
Lorenz-convex  inequality  reduction.  The  shift  of the  Lorenz  curve  between  1990  and
1999 was not a perfect convex combination between the  1990  Lorenz curve and the line
of perfect  equality,  as implied by (3).  This can be clearly  seen  in Figure  2, which  was
truncated at the median in order to facilitate visualization of the lower tail. In this picture,
the  lowest  (thick)  Lorenz  curve  is  that  for  1990.  The  solid  thin  line  is  the  simulated
Lorenz curve  corresponding  to a convex  transformation  such as  equation  (3), with a =
0.0294. The  dotted curve  is the actual  1999  Lorenz  curve. It can be seen that the factual
reduction  in inequality was not as beneficial to the bottom of the distribution as a Lorenz-
convex transformation would have been.10
Figure 2: Truncated  Lorenz Cur'ves for Brazil; actual and simulated
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This  can be  seen  even  more  clearly  a  few levels  of integration  below  the  Lorenz
curve.  Figure  3 plots  the  differences  in  the  logarithms  of income  for  each percentile,
between two pairs of distributions.  The dotted line refers to the difference  between  the
simulated distribution F*(a=0.0294,  P=0.0735)  and the actual  1990 distribution, whereas
the  solid  line  refers  to  the  difference  between  the  actual  1999  and  the  actual  1990
distributions.  Although  both  distributions  have  lower  Gini  coefficients  than  the  1990
distribution, it is apparent  that those distributions are obtained from the  1990 one through
rather different processes. In particular,  it is clear that the actual changes  at the bottom of
the  distribution  were  very  different  from  the  simple  arithmetic  simulation  implied  by
equation (3):  instead of the large proportional  gains predicted by (1), the bottom three or
four percentiles suffered considerable losses.
These  differences  should  not  come  entirely  as  a  surprise.  The  simulation  of  a
counterfactual  income  distribution  through  the  application  of equation  (1)  is  a  simple
arithmetic procedure.  There is no guarantee  whatsoever that it would be consistent either
(a) with household behavior in various realms,  such as fertility or occupational  decisions,
which can affect the distribution of income; or (b) a general equilibrium of the markets  in
the economy.
The exercise  described  in  this section  does  serve  one  useful  illustrative purpose.  It
establishes that - at least for a country as unequal  as Brazil - inequality  reduction could
in principle be a very effective  path towards the eradication of extreme  poverty and the
meeting  of  the  poverty  reduction  MDG.  A  simple  two-point  reduction  in  the  Gini
coefficient  (from  0.61  to 0.59)  over the entire twenty-five  year period could achieve  the
goal, even without any economic growth.  Conversely,  the accumulated  rate of economic
growth needed to meet the target at constant inequality is 50%. While the average annual
growth rate implied by this number (1.64%) is not high, it nevertheless  lies above the rate
observed  historically  in  the  1990s.  In  other  words,  the  inclination  of  a  country's
isopoverty  curve  can provide  some  guidance  as  to the  statistical  trade-off between  the
growth and inequality reduction rates required to reduce poverty.'2
12 Note that this refers only to the statistical trade-off between growth and inequality. Economically, it is
quite possible that there be additional trade-offs or, conversely, that some inequality reduction might
facilitate  growth.12
Undertaking  a  similar  exercise  for  eighteen  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean,  ECLAC  and  UNDP  (forthcoming)  find  that  only  seven  countries"3 in  the
sample  would  meet  their  MDG  poverty  targets  if their  growth  and  inequality  trends
during  the  1990s  were  replicated  in  2000-2015.  Another  six  countries  would  miss  the
target by 2015, but would thereafter eventually halve the incidence of extreme poverty on
the basis of their performance in the 1990s.14 Finally, a hard core of five: countries where
either  negative  economic  growth  rates  or  increasing  inequality  in  ithe  1990s,  or  a
combination of both, implied rising extreme poverty during that decade, would of course
never meet the  MDG target  under the assumption that their performances  in the  1990s
would extend indefinitely into the future.'5 Turning to consider alternative  scenarios,  the
report found that isopoverty curves in the region were almost universally "flat", implying
that the poverty-reduction  impact of a percentage-point reduction  in the Gini coefficient
(under  the  maintained  Lorenz-convexity  assumption)  was  equivalent  to  that  of many
percentage points in accumulated economic growth.
The  very  fact  that the  poverty-reduction  impact  of economic  growth  is  relatively
weak in Latin America is itself associated with the region's high level of inequality (see,
for instance, Bourguignon,  2002). The international  evidence  strongly  suggests that, with
everything else  constant, inequality reduces the growth elasticity of poverty reduction,  so
that an additional percentage point in the growth rate has a lower effect on (most) poverty
measures  in  a high-inequality  country,  than  in  a  more  egalitarian  one.  See  Ravallion
(1997).  Since  Latin  America  is  a  highly unequal  region  (and  Brazil  a highly  unequal
country),  economic  growth  there  translates  into  lower  rates  of poverty  reduction  than
elsewhere.  This  has  an  important  additional  implication:  going  beyornd  the  statistical
decomposition  reported  here,  it  is  likely  that reducing  inequality will  not  only  reduce
poverty directly now, but also that it will augment the future effects of economic  growth
on poverty.
The  general  implication  is  that policies  aimed  directly  at  reducing  inequality  may
have high returns  in terms of poverty reduction both now and in the future, provided they
3  Argentina (pre-crisis), Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panarma  amd Uruguay.
"4  Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,  Mexico and Nicaragua.  The Brazilian result differs from
ours because those authors assumed a constant inequality rate during the 1990s.
15  Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.13
do  not have high efficiency costs.  In  the particular  case of Brazil, Table  3 revealed  that
the  growth  rate  required  to  halve  extreme  poverty  from  its  1990  level  without  any
inequality reduction would be 60% higher than the rate actually observed in the 1  990s. It
also  indicated  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  economic  growth,  blanket  untargeted
redistribution would require a substantial  additional fiscal effort (of some 3.4% of GDP).
The clear  implication  is that  whichever  growth  rate can be achieved  in the  next twelve
years should be complemented by redistribution policies which are more directly targeted
to the poor. In this way, they can contribute more to poverty reduction,  at a lower fiscal
cost.
The simple  simulation exercise  reported in this Section can not take us much  further
than this. While it was useful in deriving these general conclusions,  the exercise has clear
limitations.  *The Brazilian  1990-1999  experience,  as  illustrated  by  Figures  2  and  3,
provides  a good  example  of how  flawed  the assumption  of Lorenz-convexity  can be  in
approximating  real  distribution  dynamics.  The  changes  in  a  distribution  of household
incomes  are  the  complex  outcome  of  a  number  of underlying  economic  and  social
phenomena,  such  as changes  in the productive  endowments  available  to workers  in the
economy;  changes in retums to worker characteristics;  changes in participation decisions;
changes  in  family composition;  and so  on. In the  next section,  we turn  to an empirical
model of household  income determination  which seeks to incorporate some of these key
dimensions, in the hope that it can provide more specific policy guidance.
3.  Behind the Mean and the Lorenz Curve: can a little microeconomics
help?
One reason why a simple transformation of the Lorenz Curve such as that implied by
equation  (1) can  perform  poorly  in  approximating  actual  observed  changes  is  that
household incomes are not random numbers drawn from some statistical law defined over
the  population.  Rather,  they  are  determined  by  the  combination  of  labor  and  other
incomes  accruing  to  various  household  members,  and thus  depend  on their  individual
occupational  decisions,  on the  human and  physical assets  they own, and on the  rates at14
which  the  markets  remunerate -those  assets.  A  simple  descriptive  model  of household
income determination might therefore be given by the following four blocks'6:
Block I: Household  Income Aggregation
(7)  y~~~h  [ id.-k#h  +DI 
This identity  simply defines  a household's  income per capita  from  the  sum of labor
incomes  across occupations (indexed by j) and across household  members (indexed by i).
yo denotes all non-labor incomes accruing to the household, and nh is household  size. IJ is
an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  one  if household  member  i participates  in
occupation j, and zero otherwise.
Block II: Earnings  Equations
(8)  Log yhji = X, 4  i +
Equation (8) is a standard Mincerian earnings equation. In what follows, four such
equations are estimated  separately. One is for age group  10-15, which is used only in the
simulation of a specific policy (Bolsa Escola) such as  it exists  now.'Another  one  is for
the  age  group  10  -18.  Two  are  estimated  for  those  aged  19  and older:  one  for  own-
account  workers  ("conta-pr6prias")  and  employers;  and  another  for  wage-earning
employees.1 7 In  all  cases,  workers  were  assigned  to  the  sectors  of  their  principal
occupation.  The  vector X,  as is  customary,  contained  characteristics  both  of the worker
and of the job.  In  this  case, X included  years  of schooling  (year  dummies),  age,  age
squared,  age  interacted  with  schooling,  a  gender  dummy,  race  (white,  non-white),
formality  status,  and  spatial  variables  (region  of the  country,  urban/rmral).  The  exact
specification  and results for the  19-and-older group (for the under- 18 group) are reported
in Table Al (Table A2) in the Appendix.
16 This model is adapted from Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998). Unlike those authors, we do not
model fertility decisions, since  simulations of that aspect of behavior would be difficult in this particular
application. Note, however, that the effects of education  which operate through the conditional distribution
of family sizes can be substantial.  See also Ferreira and Leite (2002).
17  Dummies are included to distinguish between "com carteira",  "sem carteira"  and public servants.15
Block III: Occupational  Structure
ez, r,
(9)  Pi  --  where s, j  oc. categories.  For those aged  19 or older.
eZIY'  +XeZIYj
j¢s
Pk  e(Z  hY  +Y  {atk +  WI  .fi* 
(10)  Pi  Ee(Z,.,+Y,a,+Wg.o,)  For those aged  10-18.
J
This block models the structure of occupations  in the labor force by means of two
similar discrete choice  models - specifically,  two multinomial  logits - which estimate
the probability of choice of each occupation  as a function of a set of family and personal
characteristics.  Table A3 contains  the specification and results for those aged  19 or older,
with  inactivity  and  unemployment  as  the  base  category.  The  other  occupational
categories  are  self-employment  ("conta-pr6pria');  formal  private  sector  employment
("com  carteira");  informal  private  sector  employment  ("sem  carteira");  public  service;
and being an employer.  Table A4 presents the specification and results for those aged  10-
18,  for whom  the choice of occupations  is modeled differently:  a young person may not
attend  school  (base  category),  attend  school  only and not  work  in the  market;  or both
attend school and work in the market. 8
Note  that  the  occupational  choice  model  for adults  is  written  in reduced  form,
since it does  not include the  wage rate  (or earnings)  of the  individual  (or of its  family
members) as explanatory variables.  Instead, his or her productive characteristics  (and the
averages  for the household) are included to proxy for earning potential. This approach is
adopted  to maintain  the  econometrics  of joint  estimation (with  Block II) tractable.  The
model for 10-18 year-olds,  on the other hand,  is estimated as a structural model, with the
predicted earnings  from the earnings equation reported in Table A2 included as  wi in the
18  We do not place  any emphasis on the possible interpretations of equations  (9))4l 0) as reduced forms of
utility-maximizing  behavioral  models.  Instead,  we  interpret  them  as  parametric  approximations  to  the
relevant  conditional  distributions; that is to say, as descriptions  of the statistical associations present  in the
data,  under  some  maintained  assumptions  about  the  functional  forms  of the relevant  joint  multivariate
distributions.  See  Bourguignon, Ferreira  and Leite (2002a)  for a more detailed  statistical  discussion of this
kind of counterfactual analysis.16
RHS for all youngsters,  as a measure of potential earnings.1 9 Other incomes  accruing to
the family - but not to the child - are also included, and denoted by Y-j.
Block IV: The Distribution  of  Education
(11)  OPM(e I  a,r,g,s):  P(e,|M)= D[cc(e,)-Mg]-  D[c(e,, })-M.6]
This block models an individual's choice of final educational attainment (in terms
of years  of schooling),  as a function of his or her age  (a),  race (r), gender (g) and spatial
characteristics (s),  which are grouped  in the matrix M.  Unlike the choices underlying the
occupational  structure  of the  population,  educational  choices  follow a specific  ordering
by years,  and are therefore  more  appropriately  represented by an ordered probit model
(OPM).  This  approach  models  the  probabil:ity  (conditional  on  M)  that  an  individual
chooses  education  level  ei as the difference  between the cumulative normal  distribution
('D)  evaluated at cut-off points estimated for levels  eq and  eq I. The estirnation results for
(11),  containing  both  the  estimated  values  for  o  and  the  seventeen  estimated  cut-off
points, are given in Table A5.
Although it consists only of four basic equations, this model does seem rather more
complicated  than the  one  presented  in  Section  2.  There  had  better  be  a real  gain  in
understanding  and  insight,  to compensate  for the additional  complexity.  We  argue  that
this gain  is real,  and  arises  from  the  ability to  simulate policy  outcomes,  which were
impossible to specify in the more general framework of the previous section. To illustrate
this  point,  we  will  use  equations  (7)-(l 1) to  simulate  the  effects  of three  different
"policies"  on the Brazilian distribution of household  incomes.  Since  the purpose  of the
19 The occupational  choice  model for this age group had to be structural because of the nature of the policy
intervention under study for these individuals: it must be able to predict changes in children's occupations
as a result of transfers conditional on school attendance, taking account of the opportunity costs of
schooling in terms of forgone  earnings. Simultaneity  concerns are alleviated by the fact that only predicted
-rather than actual - earnings are used on the RHS of the Multinomial logit model. Selection issues  into the
sample for which the earnings  equation is estimated are difficult to address. We follow 'Bourguignon  et.al.
(2001) in being skeptical of the Lee (1983) model for multivariate selection bias correction.  A bivariate
Heckman correction procedure  was tried, but abandoned because (a) it was inconsistent with a trivariate
model of occupational  choice, such as (10), and (b) the estimated coefficients of the Mills ratios had values
which were difficult to interpret. This part of the model draws  heavily on Bourguignon, Ferreira  and Leite
(2002b), where specification and estimation are discussed in greater detail.17
exercise  is  forward-looking,  we  take  the  1999  distribution  as  the base,  on  which we
implement the simulations.
Policy  Scenario  One  is  an  increase  in  individual  educational  endowments.20 To
simulate this increase,  we depart  from the existing  1999 PNAD data base to construct  a
2015  counterfactual  data-base.  If  one  had  panel  data,  or even  many  repeated  cross-
sections from which to construct pseudo-panels, one might try to analyze the educational,
fertility and occupational dynamics of different  cohorts, and to predict how these cohorts
might behave in 2015.  Such longitudinal data is not available to us and,  even if it were,
we would still be faced with missing observations for the young in 2015.
Instead, we make  some adjustments to the 1999 data base. For individuals aged 35 or
older,  we  predict education  in the  counterfactual  (2015)  data base, using equation  (11)
and their actual residuals, but replacing their age by their age minus sixteen. The effect of
this operation  is to replace  each of these persons by individuals  with identical  observed
and unobserved characteristics,  but with educational levels prevailing in the cohort which
was sixteen years younger in 1999.
For individuals  aged  18  to 34 - i.e. those who would have been two to eighteen in
1999,  we simulate an educational  expansion which increases mean years  of schooling in
the population (five years or older) at the same annual rate (2.34% p.a.) as was observed
between  1990 and  1999. This is done by shifting the cut-off points in the ordered probit
model  from  their estimated  values (see Table A5)  to the  right by a constant,  until the
average predicted mean years of schooling changed from 5.2 (as observed in 1999) to 7.5
= (1.0234)16*5.2.  The educational  positions of individuals aged  17  or younger were left
unchanged.2'
20  We do not simulate the actual policies which might lead to these increases in educational attainment,
such as additional  expenditures  on school  inputs (such as teachers), adoption of school vouchers, and the
like. While  that would be very interesting,  it lies beyond the scope of this paper. We simulate merely the
impact (on occupations  and incom es) of the outcomes of policies which might have generated  such
increases.
21  This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, since it allows us to separate the educational  simulation
from the occupational choice problem of the young, to which we will turn in Scenarios Two and Three.
However, it is probably unrealistic  to suppose that the educational preferences of the young  would have
remained constant in a setting  where adults  were more educated. The impact-of this possible
underestimation of schooling amongst the young on household incomes is ambiguous: on the one hand,
those who acquired more education and dropped out of school would have been likely to be commanding
higher wages. On the other, a number of children would be earning less (from child labor), because of more
time spent studying.18
These  procedures  generated  counterfactual  years  of schooling  for everyone  in our
simulated  2015  database.  We  then  feed  these  counterfactual  educational  attainments
through  equations  (8)-(9),  generating  a  counterfactual  occupational  structure  and  a
counterfactual  earnings  distribution  for  the  population.  Once -these  are  aggregated
through equation (7), we have created a counterfactual household income distribution for
Brazil, which departs, from the  1999  distribution,  and  differs  only  in ways that reflect
well-specified  changes in the conditional distribution of educational endowments.
In Table 4 and Figure 4, results of this simiulation  are presented in twvo steps, in order
to  highlight the  composition  of the  effects.  Table  4 compares  three  poverty  and  four
inequality  measures for each counterfactual  distribution,  with those  for the  actual  1990
and  1999 distributions.  Figure 4 plots the differences  in the logarithms of mean income
per percentile between the counterfactual  distributions and the actual 1999 distribution. In
both cases, the column (or curve) labeled "a & ,B"  refers to the counterfactual  distribution
where only the direct impact of changes in education on earnings  (through equation  8) is
taken into account. The columnn (or curve) labeled "a, p & X"  refer to the counterfactual
distribution where irnipacts on occupational  choice are also included.
The  simulated  declines  in  poverty  arising  from  this  policy  are  not  large.  Mean
incomes  do rise as  a result of greater educational  endowriients22 (and of greater  induced
labor  force  participation,  in  the  "a,  1 &  X" simulation),  but  inequality  behaves
ambiguously.  Whereas  the, Theil-T  and  E(2)  fall  from  1999  to  both  counterfactual
distributions,  the  Gini and the  mean  log deviation both rise.  This is  an example  of the
inequality-increasing effect which some educational expansions can have when returns to
schooling  are  sufficiently  convex.23 In  this case,  an  increase  in unemployment  and/or
inactivity  among  the very poor actually  causes  a further  increase  in inequality (for two
measures)  once -occupational  effects  are taken  into account.  This  is  very' much in line
u It is important to note, however, that the returns to education are being kept constant here.  This is clearly
arbitrary, as changes in the relative supply of skills would in general affect the return  structure. On the
other hand, this model sheds no light at all on the determinants of  the demand  for skills, and their prices
must be taken as exogenous.  Hence, the only alternative  in this kind of exercise is to provide some sort of
sensitivity analysis by simulating different counterfactuals  for different arbitrary return structures.  Due to
space constraints,  we have chosen not to present  such an analysis here, but see Ferreira and Leite (2002) for
an example.
23  See Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991); Lam (1999)  and Bourguignon et.  al. (1998) for
discussions.Table 4: Three Policy Scenarios:  Simulation Results
1990  1999  2015 simulated
a&P  a,j3&k  X  t  a,  ,X&t
Mean Income  232.66  254.90  279.10  282.49  255.70  255.78  283.84
Poverty measures
Poverty Headcount - FGT(O)  7.46%  5.29%  4.98%  5.02%  4.14%  3.87%  3.68%
Povety Gap -FGT(1)  2.97%  2.50%  2.40%  2.45%  1.91%  1.78%  1.73%
FGT(2)  1.83%  1.77%  1.73%  1.77%  1.30%  1.22%  1.20%
Inequality measures
Mean of logarithmic  deviation - E(O)  0.7416  0.6934  0.7033  0.7065  0.6618  0.6545  0.6672
Theil index -E(l)  0.7663  0.7045  0.6959  0.6956  0.6947  0.6921  0.6836
Half  e  Coefficient of Variation Squared -E(2)  2.1286  1.5837  1.4922  1.4830  1.5692  1.5665  1.4649
Gini coefficient  0.6119  0.5889  0.5929  0.5933  0.5869  0.5855  0.5875
Net enrollment in primary education (6 to  15 years old)  0.8008  0.9343  0.9343  0.9343  0.9482  0.9464  0.9594
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (0 to 8 ys)  1.0255  0.9646  0.9314  0.9314  0.9646  0.9608  0.9244
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary  education (9 to 12 ys)  1.2695  1.3105  1.1460  1.1460  1.3106  1.3128  1.1414
Ratio of girls to boys in terciary education  (13 or more ys)  1.0199  1.3042  1.3308  1.3308  1.3038  1.3038  1.3404
Ratio of women to men in wage employment  0.5550  0.7137  0.7137  0.7548  0.7137  0.7137  0.7548
Source:  PNAD/IBGE  1990,  1999 and authores calculation
Key: a &  0: Policy Scenario One -Earnings effects only
a, P &  X: Policy Scenario One - Eamings and occupational  effects
r: Policy Scenario Two
t: Policy Scenario Three -Transfers  Only
a, P, x &  t: Policy Scenario Three -Completewith the result in Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999)  that increases in extreme poverty in
urban Brazil between  1985  and  1996  were  largely  due  to an occupational  effect at the
very bottom of the distribution.
Figure 4: Log Differences  Between  Counterfactual 2015 and Actual  1999
Diistributions
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As  a  result  of  these  effects,  the  incidence  of  extreme  poverty  in  Brazil  in  the
simulated distribution falls only from 5.3% to around  5.0% - well short of the Millennium
target  of  3.73%.  The  FGT  (1 and  2)  measures  fall  even  less,  proportionately.  The
imnplication is that educational  expansions  in the  scale experienced  in Brazil in the  1  990s
are  unlikely to be sufficient - on their own -- to canry  the country through to meeting its
MDG  first  target.  Since  education  is  often pointed  to  as  something  of a  distributional
panacea, this is not an entirely irrelevant finding for policy makers.
Why  is  it  that  the  simulated  expansion  in -education  had  such  a  small  effect  on
poverty'?  The main - but not the only - reason appears  to be the flatness of the returns to
schooling at very low levels of education  (1-4 years), which the poorest: people in society
tend to  have.  In Figure  5 we plot  (in the  solid line)  the  complement  to the cumulative
distribution  of years. of schooling  among  the  poor  in  Brazil  in  1999  - i.e.  the  bottom
5.29%  of  the  population.  The  dotted  line  labeled  "20 15"  plots  the  counterfactual21
distribution  of schooling  for the same individuals, under Policy Scenario One. Using the
same horizontal scale, we graph our estimate of the returns to education in Brazil in 1999:
the coefficients  on year dummies,  in a regression  of log wages on schooling and all the
controls  in Table  Al,  except  for the  interaction  terms between  age and  education.  This
model was estimated jointly for employees and self-employed.  It shows that almost 80%
of the  poor  (by  the  international  poverty  line)  in  1999  had  four  or  fewer  years  of
schooling.  Even after the counterfactual  expansion simulated under Policy Scenario One,
still nearly 70% of that  group  had four or fewer years of schooling.  Marginal  returns  to
additional schooling at those levels are very low.  The results of the simulation in Column
3 of Table  4,  where  there  are  no  occupational  effects,  indicate  that these  returns  are
insufficient to make  much of a  dent in  poverty,  by any of the  three measures reported
there.  Colurnn 4 indicates that the occupational  effect  actually  contributes to a marginal
increase in poverty.  This is because  the incidence of male unemployment  increases with
schooling in Brazil and, among the poor, this effect turns out to dominate the increases in
female labor force participation due to greater education.
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There  are  a number  of important  caveats,  of  course.  Returns  are  being  assumed
constant - as  is  the constant  term  in (8),  which might  rise with economic  growth that
arises from other sources. The impact of greater schooling among adults on the demand
for education  by their  children  is  not taken  into  account.24 Perhaps  most  importantly,
gains in per capita incomes through reductions in fertility - which are not being simulated
here  - can  be  substantial.  In  a  separate  study  (Ferreira  and  Leite,  2002)  where  it was
possible to estimate  the impact on household  incomes  of the reduction in the number of
children  in households  - both directly through reductions  in  the per capita  denominator
and indirectly through further increased  female labor force participation  - this turned out
to be substantial.  In the simulation most closely comparable  to this one, it accounted for
just under a quarter of the overall educational impact.25
On  the other hand,  there  is no  guarantee  that  the  pattern  of technical  change  will
allow returns  to low skills to rise much,  in response to a decline  in their supply.  Nor has
economic  growth  generally been  known  to deliver  rapid  rates  of poverty  reduction  in
Latin America.  And even if we allowed for an additional  fifty percent decline  in poverty,
due to fertility effects even larger than those estimated in Ferreira  and Leite (2002), this
would still only have changed the proportional  decline in Po arising from this policy from
6%  to  9%.  All  in  all,  it might  be  wise  to pay  some  heed  to the  finding  that,  under
reasonable assumptions, educational expansions - however desirable in themselves - will
not eradicate poverty in Brazil on their own.
Table  4 also contains  infornation  about the  other four targets listed in Table 2. The
row  entitled  "Poverty  Gap  - FGT(1)"  contains  the  second  indicator  under  Goal  1:
Poverty and Hunger. Like P0, this measure also falls very little as a result of the simulated
Policy  Scenario  One.  Towards the bottom of the Table,  the row on '"Net enrollment  in
private  education"  shows  considerable  actual  progress  between  1990  (80%)  and  1999
(93%). Policy Scenario One, as simulated above, does not affect enrollment rates in 2015
- because  it  does  not  alter  occupational  choices  among  children.  It  affects  only  the
24 Although this impact is incorporated  in Policy Scenario Three below and although  it wouldn't affect
incomes in 2015 in any case, except through the labor earnings  of under- 1  8s.
25 Fertility effects  could be simulated there because that was a pure "comparative statics" exercise, with no
cohort linkages between the counterfactual and the base distributions.  Here,  with only sixteen years
separating  1999 from 2015, a sensible simulation of fertility effects would have had to take cohort effects
into account. As discussed, the absence of panel or pseudo-panel data prevents us from undertaking cohort
analyses in this exercise.23
distribution  of education  among  adults.  This is why  the two  columns  corresponding to
Policy Scenario One show no change  in net enrollment from  1999. We will return  to this
indicator in the other two simulations.
The next three rows in Table 4 give the ratios of female to male students enrolled
in each of the three levels in the Brazilian education  system, in accordance  with indicator
#9  (Goal  3)  in  Table  2.  Between  1990  and  1999,  women  increased  their  enrollment
advantage  over men  in both the  secondary  and  tertiary  levels,  but  lost  in  the primary
level.  Given  that  repetition  rates  are  higher  for  males  in  primary  school  (see
Bourguignon,  Ferreira  and  Leite,  2002b)  this  might  simply  reflect  a larger  number  of
male grade-repeaters  in primary school. Alternatively,  it might signal some deeper trend
among young girls. An investigation of this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper, but
would deserve  attention among those concemed with meeting the gender equality goal in
Brazil. If one assumes that gender equality is really the goal, the female advantage at the
secondary  and  university levels  is cause  for concem.  Are  Brazilian  men  becoming  an
undereducated  substratum of the population?  Can the causes of higher rates of drop-out
among  men - which may be  related  to  child-labor,  drug-trafficking  and violence  - be
combated somehow?
Finally,  the row entitled "ratio of women to men in wage employment" approximates
the  indicator  #11,  under  Goal  3. It  is  only  an  approximation  because  we  have  not
confined  the  analysis  to the  non-agricultural  sectors.  Once  again,  the  historical gain  in
female  employment  in the  1990s  is rather  remarkable,  as the ratio climbs  from  56% to
71%.  Looking  forward  to  2015,  the  occupational  response  to  the  educational  gains
simulated under Policy Scenario One would further increase this ratio to just over 75%.
Since an educational  expansion appears  to be insufficient to meet the MDG poverty-
reduction  goals,  largely  because  it  fails  to  raise  incomes  at  the  very  bottom  of the
distribution, we tum next to a consideration of more direct redistribution.  Policy Scenario
Two consists of an increase in targeted  transfers. Here, rather than simulating a lump-sum
transfer to the poorest households in the sample - which would have ignored the practical
problems  of identifying  and reaching  them  - it seemed  more  interesting to  simulate  an
existing  transfer  program,  which has  received  considerable  attention  and  has  recently24
been expanded as a Federal program,  namely the Bolsa Escola. 26 This is done by adding
conditional  cash transfers of T = R$15  per child per month (up to a maximum of R$45
per household)  to  all households  whose  children between  the  ages  of 6 and  15  are  in
regular attendance  at a public  school, provided that the household's  pre-transfer  income
per capita level is less than  Y° = R$90 per month."
The conditional  nature  of the  transfer  is  not  innocuous  in terms  of the  estimation
procedure.  There  are  now  five  different  rectuced-form  utility  levels  in the  associated
multinomial  logit model, to be  estimated by (10).  These are  given by  (12),  with j  = 0
denoting  occupational  category "not  attending  school"; j =1  denoting "attending  school
and  working",  and j  = 2 denoting  "attending  school  only".  Notation in that equation is
exactly  as  in  (10),  and  M  is  a  part-time  adjustment  factor  for the  potential  wage  of
children who both work  and study  (see Bourguignon  et. al.,  2002b).  Since the  standard
estimation procedure for a multilogit  model  involves estimating the differences  between
parameter  values  (e.g.  al  - ao  or  P2  - Po),  the  introduction  of  incomes  which  are
asymmetric  across categories  requires additional  identification assumptions  to enable the
estimation  of (12).  The assumption we  make is that  individuals working  on the market
and not going to school (j = 0) have zero domestic productivity.  Under this assumptions,
the  occupational  choice  model  for  the  young,  given  by equations  (10)  and  (12)  was
estimated both for 10-15  year-olds and  for 10-18  year-olds  (for reasons  which will soon
become apparent),  and the results are presented in Table A4.
26 Note, however, that the purpose of simulating Policy Scenario  Two is to investigate  the effects of
redistributing current income. Our counterfactual therefore  corresponds  to a program ofiredistribution
which starts in 2015. We do not model the likely impacts of the earlier existence of  such a policy (say,
during 1999-2015) on additional schooling,  or anything else. This is therefore not an ex-ante evaluation of
Bolsa Escola. For that, please see Bo urguignon et. al. (2002b) instead. Other studies describing early
versions of the program, and trying to assess their impacts include Rocha and Sab6ia (1998), Sant'Ana and
Moraes (1997) and World Bank (2001).
27 These monetary values are kept identical to those adopted in the 2001  law which introduced the Federal
Bolsa Escola program, under the Projeto  Alvorada. Since our counterfactual  2015 distribution uses 1999
Reais as units of account,  this should not be a problem. Note also that administrative  targeting of the
benefit does not actually rely on monthly income (of R$90 or less). Instead, in practice a  household  living
standards  questionnaire (often supplemented by a visit by a social worker)  is used to ge:nerate a score,
which is calibrated to bear some resemblance  to the inccme means-test.  In our simulations, however, we do
use the PNAD total income variable for the means-test. This follows Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite
(2002b).25
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One  interesting  benefit  of estimating  this  structural  model  for the  young  is that  it
allows us not only to simulate the effect of Bolsa Escola transfers on incomes, but also on
the occupational  structure  among the young.  After all, one objective  of conditional  cash
transfer  programs  such  as this one, Progresa in Mexico28 or  PRAF in Honduras,  is to
encourage human  capital accumulation by rewarding  school attendance.  While this issue
is  discussed  in more  detail in Bourguignon,  Ferreira  and Leite (2002b),  we present  the
main  results  for  the  10-15  age  group  below,  in  Table  5.  This  table  contains  two
occupational  transition matrices  - one  for all  households  and  one  for poor households
only.  Each  cell (i, j)  in any one of these matrices gives the proportion of people moving
from  (actual)  occupational  category  i  to  (counterfactual)  occupational  category j.  The
matrix  converts  the  initial  (1999)  marginal  occupation  distribution  (in the  last column)
into the counterfactual  (2015) marginal distribution (in the bottom row).
Table 5:  Simulated effect of Bolsa Escola on schooling and working status (all children  10-15 years old)
AR Households
Not Studying  Working and Studying  Studying  Total
Not Studying  64.1%  12.3%  23.7%  6.0%
Working  and Studying  - 98.8%  1.2%  16.8%
Studying  - - 100.0%  77.2%
Total  3.8%  17.4%  78.8%  100.0%
Poor Households
Not Studying  Working and  Studying  Studying  Total
Not Studying  38.7%  20.1%  41.2%  8.7%
Working and Studying  - 99.2%  0.8%  30.1%
Studying  - - 100.0%  61.2%
Total  3.4%  31.6%  65.00/0  100.0%
Source: PNAD/IBGE  1999 and authors calculation
28 Due to the random nature of village selection in the  first stage of its beneficiary selection design,
Progresa -which  has been  renamed  "Oportunidades  " and is ongoing in Mexico - has been
comprehensively evaluated. See, for example, Parker and Skoufias  (2000) and Schultz (2000).26
It can be observed  that the simulated impact of this transfer  scheme  is to  reduce the
number of children  not enrolled  in  school  by 36%  among  all  households,  and  by over
60% among  poor households.  About a  third of these  individuals  will  attend  school  but
also keep working  in the market.  The remaining  two thirds  would counterfactually  only
attend  school.  Movement  from  the  "working  and  studying"  category  to  the  "studying
only"  category  is  negligible  in  both  groups.  The  impact  of Policy  Scenario  Two  on
incomes can be gauged  from Table 4 (column  5),  and from  Figure 4 (t line).  The small
change  in  mean  income  reported here  is  a  result of the  fact  that  our model  is  not an
equilibrium  one,  and we have not increased  taxation  anywhere  to pay for the transfers.
Even under this unrealistic "manna  from heaven"  assumption,  the increase  in the mean is
negligible,  due to the small size of the actual Bolsa Escola transfers.29 Their targeting  is
effective,  however,  so that even  these  small  transfers  reduce  inequality by much more
than  Policy  Scenario  One,  according  to  every  measure  but  the  E(2),  which  is  very
sensitive to top incomes.  All three poverty measures  also fall considerably.  The incidence
measure  Po  reaches  4.14%, much  closer to  the MDG  target  than under  Policy Scenario
One.  Once again, however,  it appears that the Bolsa Escola policy by itself - even if fully
implemented  in  every  state  of  the  Federation,  and  with  an  administrative  targeting
scheme  which successfully  identified  those  families  living under the  R$90 means-test -
would not suffice to meet the MDG poverty reduction target for Brazil.
As a natural  next  step we  simulate,  as Policy Scenario  Three,  a combination of the
previous  two policies:  an educational  expansion  identical  to Policy Scenario  One,  and a
transfer scheme  with exactly the same criteria and means-test as Bolsa Escola. This time,
however,  we  solve  for the  transfer amount,  so as  to meet  the  MDG  poverty  reduction
target.  In other  words,  we  construct  a  counterfactual  income  distribution  applying  the
model (7)-(12)  to the original  1999 PNAD data set, iterating upwards on the value  of the
per-child transfer T (in equation  12), until the poverty incidence  Po for the counterfactual
distribution reaches  or falls  below 3.73%.30  Remarkably, the value of the individual per-
29 As noted by one of  the referees, the simulation of Policy Scenario One  suffers from the same lack of
fiscal closure, since we do not account for the need to pay for the costs of additional  schooling.
30 To be consistent, this combination required that the years of schooling variables for both youngsters and
their parents  which are used in the simulation of (10) be adjusted to reflect gains in educational
endowments  arising from Policy Scenario  One. Similarly, parental occupation variables  had to be adjusted
to account  for changes  induced by the simulated occupations  in (9).27
child transfer  which  enables  the  counterfactual  distribution  to  reach  the  poverty target
was exactly T = R$15, just as  in the current program. However,  the transfer design in our
Policy Scenario  Three  differs  from  the  current Bolsa Escola design  in  two ways:  first,
there is no household transfer ceiling;  second, youngsters  in the  16-18 age range are also
eligible.31
The results  for poverty and  inequality  are given in the  last two  columns  of Table  4,
and by the  "ac,  ,,  x & t" line in Figure 4.  Column 6 in Table 4 (labeled "t") corresponds
to  the  counterfactual  distribution  under  the  modified transfer  scheme  (i.e.  as  in  t,  but
expanded  to  16-18  year-olds,  and  with  no  benefit  ceiling),  without  the  educational
expansion.  It  shows  that  the  expansion  of the  original  Bolsa-Escola  design  further
reduces both poverty and inequality, bringing the Po indicator to 3.87% - very close to the
MDG target.  When an educational  expansion as described under Policy Scenario  One is
then further combined with this transfer scheme,  poverty incidence finally falls to 3.68%,
just  below  the  MDG  target.  The  poverty  gap  ratio  and FGT  (2)  also  fall  substantially
from 1990, but by less than 50%.
In  terms  of  inequality,  the  counterfactual  Gini  coefficient  under  Policy  Scenario
Three  is  almost  unchanged  with  respect  to  the  actual  1999  coefficient.  Most  of the
poverty-reduction  effect came from changes at the very bottom of the distribution,  as can
be seen from the more pronounced fall in the mean log deviation,  which is more sensitive
to these incomes, and from the "a,  3,  X  & T"  line in Figure 4. This line shows clearly that
the largely  proportional  gains  from  Policy Scenario  Three accrue  exactly to  the bottom
five  percent  of  the  population  - exactly  the  group  which  was  overlooked  by  the
educational expansion under Policy Scenario One.
Gains  elsewhere  in  the  distribution,  and  particularly  from  the  second  quintile
upwards,  are  much  more  like  those  from  Policy  Scenario  One.  This  is  because  the
transfer component of Policy Scenario Three  is well targeted,  as in the real Bolsa Escola
program,  and hence  has  almost  no impact  above  that range  of the  income distribution.
31 The maximum transfer to a single household was R$150, indicating that ten children in this household
attended school in  the counterfactual  distribution.  The average transfer per household, among those
receiving positive transfers  (6,838,017 households in  the expanded sample), was R$36.70. Note also that
the inclusion of 16-18  year-olds corresponds roughly to the extension of the benefit to secondary schools,
which many commentators have suggested. See World Bank (2001)  and Camargo and Ferreira (2001).28
The transfers  do,  however,  have  a  sizeable impact  on the  schooling  decisions  of those
children  at which  they  are  aimed.  Table  6 below  is  a counterfactual  transition matrix
analogous  to Table  5, but for  10-18  year-olds.  Now that the transfers  are combined with
higher schooling levels  for both students (parlicularly  at the higher  ages;)  and parents,  the
number  of children  entering  school  is  even  higher  than  before:  over  50%  among  all
households, and 65% among the poor.
Table 6: Sirmlated effect of Bolsa Escola on sdooling and mrking stats (all childin 10-18 jU  old) after  simuations
All Households
Not Studying  Working and Studying  Studying  Total
Not Studying  45.8%  26.90/o  27.3%  14.2%
Woeking and Studying  - 95.3%  4.70/o  22.3%
StU4*  - 1.9%  98.0%  63.6%
Total  6.5%  26.3%  67.2%  100.0%
Poor Households
Not Studying  Woking and Studying  Studying  Total
Not Studying  36.50  30.6%  32.80/o  15.4%
Working and Stuying  96.8%  3.2%  31.2%
Studying  0.6%  99.4%  53.4%
Total  5.6%  35.2%o  59.1%  100.0%
Swa  PNADIBGE  1999 and auSs  calolain
Mobility  from  the  "working  and  studying"  category  to  the  "studying  only"
category  is  also  higher  than  before,  but  still  not  substantial.  Interestingly,  the
educational  gains which are incorporated  into  this counterfactual  mean that it is now
possible  to have people moving in the reverse  direction:  from studying  only to both
working and  studying.  This arises because  one does not lose one's  entitlement to the
transfer,  and the multinomial logit model indicates that, with the additional education
level, this individual would most likely now also be working.
The total  annual  cost of the transfers  disbursed  under the  counterfactual  Policy
Scenario Three would have been approximately  R$ 3 billion,  always in  1999 prices.
This amount excludes any  administrative  costs, as well as the costs  of implementing
the educational  reform policies underlying  the increases in schooling simulated as  in
Policy Scenario One. It corresponds to 0.31 % of the Brazilian GDP in 1999.29
4.  Conclusions
In this paper, we have sought  to investigate whether  micro-simulation techniques
can shed  any  light  on the  kinds of policies  which  might help  countries  reach  their
Millennium  Development  Goals.  Rather  than  trying  to  cover  many  countries
superficially,  the  approach  we  adopted  was  to test  a richer  set of approaches  for a
single country. We picked Brazil, with which we are most familiar.  We started out in
Section  2  with  a  simple  statistical  procedure,  based  on  different  combinations  of
growth  rates  and  inequality  reductions  which  would be consistent  with the  poverty
reduction  target.  This  exercise  suggested  that,  at least  for  a  country  as  unequal  as
Brazil,  the  MDG  poverty  reduction  target  could  be  attained  through  a  modest
reduction  in  inequality,  but  would  require  a  growth  rate  well  above  the  recent
historical  average  if the Lorenz  curve  remained unchanged.  Unless  Brazil's growth
performance improves considerably over the next decade  (with respect to the  1990s),
then some  amount  of redistribution  will be required  to  ensure  that  the  Millennium
Development  Goal poverty reduction target is met. Additionally,  if that redistribution
were to be accomplished through a universal lump-sum  transfer - rather than through
more targeted  interventions  - its  financing  would  imply  a  sizable  additional  fiscal
effort.
While this is a useful general policy message, the 'statistical'  approach  adopted in
Section  2  was  too  aggregated  for  thinking  about  specific  policies,  be  they  for
education,  labor markets,  redistribution schemes,  or what have you.  Additionally, the
underlying  assumption  of the  specific  form in which inequality  was reduced  in that
particular  simulation - which we called Lorenz-convex  inequality reduction  - turned
out to be strong.  In Brazil,  the fall in the Gini coefficient actually  observed between
1990  and  1999  - in conjunction  with  the observed  growth  rate  - would  have been
enough  to more  than meet  the MDG.  Nevertheless,  the  country's  observed poverty
incidence  in  1999  was  still  well above  the target - because  the  shift in the  Lorenz
curve which generated that reduction in the Gini was nothing like the simulated one.
This persuaded us of the need to employ a structurally richer model of household
income  determination,  which was  presented  in  Section  3, and  included parametric30
models  for  earnings,  occupational  and  educational  distributions,  conditional  on  a
number of observed individual  and household  characteristics.  On the  basis of these
estimated models,  we  simulated three different  policy  scenarios  on the  1999  PNAD
data base, attempting to construct plausible  outcomes  for 2015. Policy  Scenario One
consisted  of an  increase  in  the  schooling  levels of the population,  calibrated  to  be
consistent  with the increases  observed over the  1990s. Policy Scenario  Two was  the
federal  Bolsa  Escola  program,  as  currently  designed,  as  if it  were  functioning
country-wide.  Policy  Scenario Three  was a combination of the previous  two,  with a
limited expansion in the coverage of the transfer benefit.
Throughout, we  attempted to keep  the limitations  of the exercise  and the strength
of the  assumptions  underlying  it  at the forefront.  Even  in these  simulations,  which
take existing behavioral patterns  into account to a much greater extent,  we are unable
to predict how prices - and the prices of skills in the labor market in particular - will
respond to the changes we  simulate. Or indeed to all the other myriad changes which
we  do  not  simulate,  and  have  no  idea  about.  This  abstraction  from  equilibrium
responses  is  a  general  characteristic  of simulations  in the  Oaxacat  (1973);  Blinder
(1973)  family.32 But it is less problematic  when used in the context for which it was
originally designed,  namely to  decompose  changes  that  have  already  happened  and
been observed into different effects.  In the present context, when a single structure is
observed and used to construct  an entire counterfactual  in the  future, the  limitations
are very serious indeed.
Nevertheless,  some  of  the  findings  from  our  Section  3  simulations  were
interesting.  First,  an expansion  in  schooling  levels  appears  to be unlikely  to  reduce
extreme poverty by very much, because  returns to an additional year of schooling  at
very low  levels of education are too  small.  Educational  expansions  are  enormously
beneficial to society as a whole, but their impacts on the poorest of the poor are likely
to be indirect, and could take a very long time to be felt. If policy-makers in a country
like Brazil were serious about reducing the incidence  and severity of extreme poverty,
it seems almost certain that they should rely on some form of redistribution.
32 See DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996)  and Bourguignon,  Ferreira and Leite (2002a)  for discussions.31
In  that  context,  a  conditional  cash-transfer  program,  like  Bolsa  Escola  or
Progresa,  designed with  incentive considerations  very much in mind, would appear
to be a natural candidate.  Our simulations indicate  that, whereas a program like Bolsa
Escola might not be  sufficient in  isolation  and in their current format, it might be a
very important tool in meeting the Millennium Development Goals, if combined with
a  set of sustained  policies  aimed  at expanding  educational  attainrnents.  Our Policy
Scenario  Three,  which could be  described as  a Bolsa Escola extended to secondary
school  and without  household  ceilings,  combined with an educational  expansion  at
the pace which was observed historically  in Brazil  during the  1990s,  does generate a
counterfactual  distribution where  the incidence of poverty  is below the  MDG target
for  the  country.  And  because  it  is  narrowly  targeted  to  the  poor,  its  fiscal
requirements  are an order of magnitude  smaller than those  of a universal  lurnp-sum
redistribution scheme  such as that implied by equation (1) in Section 2: 0.3% - rather
than 3% - of GDP.
Of course, because prices might change; because occupational  structures might no
longer be governed by the parametric relationships  estimated in  1999;  and because of
a  million  other  unforeseen  events,  these  are  not  predictions.  Our scenarios  are  not
intended  - and  should  never be taken  - as detailed policy blueprints.  But they may,
perhaps, be useful as an indication of the broad types of policies which policy makers
might want to focus  on, if they are interested in reducing extreme poverty in unequal
middle-income  countries.
It turns  out that  the  extreme  poor  in these  countries  are  hard  to  reach  through
"blunt"  policy  instruments  like  generalized  educational  expansions.  Distribution-
neutral economic  growth - which certainly is good for the poor - also needs to be of
some  magnitude  to  translate  into  the  absolute  income  increments  needed  to raise
those at the very bottom of the distribution above the relevant poverty  lines. If such
copious  growth  is  for  some  reason  not  immediately  forthcoming,  "sharper"  tools -
like  fiscally  affordable  targeted  conditional  redistribution  programs  - can  become
very useful complements  to broad-based educational and income expansions.32
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Appendix.
Equation (4) can be obtained as follows. We know that the Gini Coefficient is given by:
G(Y) =  21  IY-Y 
It follows from (1) that:  y*  - y 1*y = (jl+0)(1-a)jyj-  yjj
Thus:  1  Iyi"j  - I = (1+0)(1-a)y_jy  - yjI
Dividing through by 2n2(1+I3)1Ay:
(2n2A,*)-l  yj*  - yj*F  l  (2n2(l+J),ty'(l+I)(i-a)XXIyi  yji
which yields equation (4).35
Table Al: Micerian Equation for adults (above  18 years old)
Self-employed and Enployer  Employees:  Formal, infonnal and public  servauts
Coefficient  Std  P>Izl  Coefficient  Std  P>kz
R
2 0.52  0.59
#obs  39,071  81,918
Yeas ofachoolmg
1  0.0805  0.0281  0.0040  -0.0086  0.0158  0.5840
2  0.1646  0.0245  0.0000  40.0465  0.0131  0.0000
3  0.2202  0.0245  0.0000  -0.0332  0.0130  0.0100
4  0.3603  0.0251  0.0000  -0.0089  0.0128  0.4880
5  0.4145  0.0327  0.0000  0.0024  0.0156  0.8760
6  0.4470  0.0368  0.0000  0.0052  0.0177  0.7710
7  0.5210  0.0392  0.0000  -0.0214  0.0188  0.2540
8  0.5732  0.0393  0.0000  0.0416  0.0192  0.0300
9  0.5296  0.0548  0.0000  0.0302  0.0229  0.1860
lo  0.6555  0.0505  0.0000  0.0495  0.0234  0.0350
lI  0.8045  0.0482  0.0000  0.2230  0.0228  0.0000
12  0.9970  0.0890  0.0000  0.4566  0.0316  0.0000
13  1.0622  0.0756  0.0000  0.4579  0.0337  0.0000
14  1.0457  0.0796  0.0000  0.5351  0.0343  0.0000
15  1.3055  0.0697  0.0000  0.6911  0.0331  0.0000
16  1.4778  0.0758  0.0000  0.8992  0.0380  0.0000
17  1.7109  0.0986  0.0000  0.9884  0.0468  0.0000
Age  0.0526  0.0024  0.0000  0.0468  0.0013  0.0000
Agp2  -0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0006  0.0000  0.0000
Intemclion  beween  age and  schooling  0.0005  0.0001  0.0000  0.0014  0.0001  0.0000
Male  0.6702  0.0110  0.0000  0.4595  0.0046  0.0000
White  0.2250  0.0106  0.0000  0.1368  0.0048  0.0000
Am
Urbansnetcpolilaa  -0.1539  0.0109  0.0000  -0.1971  0.0048  0.0000
RwW  -0.4709  0.0145  0.0000  -0.3768  0.0075  0.0000
Occupation
selfemployri  -0.8164  0.0141  0.0000
Fonral  -0.0260  0.0077  0.0010
Infonn  l  -0.4102  0.0085  0.0000
Region
Noshb  -0.1356  0.0181  0.0000  -0.0844  0.0093  0.0000
Notbeast  -0.4507  0.0128  0.0000  -0.3696  0.0059  0.0000
South  -0.1220  0.0138  0.0000  -0.0783  0.0062  0.0000
Ce.it.w.  -0.0044  0.0160  0.7840  -0.0199  0.0068  0.0040
Intaeep  4.4372  0.0634  0.0000  4.4388  0.0314  0.0000
Soetcr PNAThIBOE  1999  and authoes caleulation36
Table A2: Earnings Equation for the Young
10 to 15 years old'  10 to  18 years old2
Coefficient  Std  P>jzl  Coefficient  Std  P>IzI
n obs  2428  8637
R 2 0.48  0.51
Dummy WS  -0.2956  0.0335  0.0000  -0.1293  0.0147  0.0000
Years of schooling  -0.0483  0.0192  0.0120  -0.0128  0.0085  0.1300
Age  0.1538  0.0118  0.0000  0.1464  0.0047  0.0000
Years of schooling2 0.0095  0.0020  0.0000  0.0042  0.0007  0.0000
Male  0.1590  0.0273  0.0000  0.2210  0.0140  0.0000
White  0.0844  0.0277  0.0020  0.0752  0.0144  0.0000
Urban non metroplitan  0.0341  0.0315  0.2800  -0.0815  0.0152  0.0000
Rural  0.0334  0.0393  0.3940  -0.1197  0.0205  0.0000
North  -0.1806  0.0440  0.0000  -0.0720  0.0255  0.0050
Northeast  -0.1984  0.0365  0.0000  -0.1941  0.0202  0.0000
South  -0.0280  0.0403  0.4860  -0.0470  0.0183  0.0100
Center-West  -0.1189  0.0397  0.0030  -0.0837  0.0196  0.0000
Log of means earnings by cluster  0.3725  0.0141  0.0000  0.3580  0.0097  0.0000
Intercept  1.3783  0.1745  0.0000  1.1375  0.0892  0.0000
Notes:
-Log of means earnings by cluster computed for children between  10  to 15
-Log of means earnings by cluster computed for children between  10  to 18
Source: PNAD/IBGE  1999 and authors calculationTable A3: The Multinomial  Logit Estimates for Participation Behavior and Occupational Choice for adults (above  18 years old)
Self-employed  Formal  Informal  Public servants  Employers
ME*  P>Iz|  MME  P>|z|  MM  P>Iz|  zM*  P*  ME*  P>iz|
Pseudo RX  0.1798
#obs  210,000
Yearsofschooling  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.121  - 0.000  - 0.000
Years  of schooling2  - 0.730  - 0.416  - 0.000  - 0.008  - 0.058
Age  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000
Age2  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0,000
Interaction  between  age and schooling  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000
Male  0.155  0.000  0.084  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.043  0.000
White  0.013  0.000  -0.008  0.060  -0.020  0.000  -0.009  0.000  0.017  0.000
Average endowments of age  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.662  0.000  0.000
Average endowments of schooling  0.000  0.642  -0.003  0.000  -0.006  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.002  0.000
#ofbouscholdsncmbcrbelowltyearsold  0.004  0.000  40.005  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.276  0.000  0.873
#of  households mamber  beween  19  and 64 yea  old  -0.011  0.000  0.006  0.000  -0.005  0.000  -0.001  0.278  -0.002  0.000
#ofhouseolds  nemnberabove65yearsold  0.005  0.081  -0.026  0.000  -0.020  0.000  -0.003  0.109  0.009  0.000
Head of the household  0.186  0.000  0.190  0.000  0.070  0.000  0.046  0.000  0.053  0.000
2nd head of the household  0.031  0.000  -0.079  0.000  -0.074  0.000  0.006  0.001  0.016  0.000
Ifnotthehead,theheadisactive?  0.002  0.178  -0.030  0.000  -0.006  0.000  -0.005  0.000  0.010  0.000
Area
Urban non-metropolitan  0.021  0.000  -0.014  0.049  0.026  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.016  0.000
Rural  0.070  0.000  -0.105  0.000  0.015  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.018  0.000
Region
North  0.040  0.000  -0.176  0.000  -0.021  0.629  0.025  0.000  0.001  0.010
Northeast  0.068  0.000  -0.126  0.000  -0.020  0.000  0.014  0.000  0.003  0.001
South  0.026  0.000  0.016  0.000  40.015  0.000  0.002  0.348  0.002  0.047
Center-West  0.000  0.011  -0.065  0.000  0.018  0.000  0.021  0.000  0.007  0.000
ep"t  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000  - 0.000
Source: PNAD/IBGE  1999 and authors calculation
Note: ME*:  Marginal Effect calculated from the estimated coefficients.
The marginal effects  for age and education  are omitted due to the interaction  terms.Table A4:  The Multinomial Logit Estimates for Participation
Behavior and Occupational  Choice for the Young
Working and Studying  Studying
Pseudo-R'  #obs  ME*  P>Izl  ME*  P>IZI
10 to 15 years old  0.2145  43418
Total household income  0.000  0.065  0.000  0.000
Earning's children (What)  0.002  0.001  -0.004  0.000
Total people by household  0.009  0.000  -0.007  0.196
Age  - 0.000  - 0.000
Years of schooling  0.000  - 0.000
(Age-schooling)
2 - 0.001  - 0.091
White  -0.028  0.997  0.038  0.000
Male  0.101  0.000  -0.087  0.036
Max parenfs education  -0.008  0.000  0.013  0.000
Max parent's age  -0.001  0.403  0.001  0.000
Number of children (O  to 5 years old)  -0.001  0.000  -0.010  0.000
Rank of child  0.014  0.219  -0.014  0.546
Urban non metroplitan  0.031  0.015  -0.032  0.451
Rural  0.212  0.000  -0.219  0.000
North  0.093  0.000  -0.084  0.742
Northeast  0.094  0.000  -0.076  0.006
South  0.095  0.023  -0.117  0.000
Center-West  0.069  0.002  -0.075  0.026
Means of earnings by cluster  -0.002  0.000  0.004  0.000
Intercept  -0.729  0.000  1.216  0.000
10 to 18 years old  0.2557  65507
Total household income  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00
Earning's children (What)  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00
Total people by household  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
Age  - 0.00  - 0.00
Years of schooling  0.00  0.00
(Age-schooling)2 - 0.00  - 0.01
White  -0.02  0.55  0.02  0.00
Male  0.08  0.00  -0.08  0.61
Max parent's  education  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00
Max parent's age  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Number of children (O  to 5 years old)  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.00
Rank of child  0.01  0.71  -0.02  0.00
Urban non metroplitan  0.03  0.24  -0.04  0.00
Rural  0.18  0.00  -0.22  0.00
North  0.04  0.00  -0.03  0.00
Northeast  0.06  0.00  -0.04  0.00
South  0.07  0.74  -0.10  0.00
Center-West  0.05  0.00  -0.06  0.01
Means of earnings by cluster  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.00
Intercept  -0.77  0.00  1.31  0.00
Source:  PNAD/IBGE  1999 and author's calculation
Note: ME*: Marginal Effect calculated from the estimated coefficients.
The marginal effects  for age and education  are omitted due to the interaction terms.Table A5: Ordered Probit model (5 years old or more)
Coefficien Std  P>IzI
Age group
5 to  10  -1.6811  0.0062  0.0000
11  to 18  -0.0218  0.0040  0.0000
Male  -0.0405  0.0041  0.0000
White  0.3851  0.0045  0.0000
Area
Urban non-metropolitan  -0.2275  0.0046  0.0000
Rural  -0.8049  0.0061  0.0000
Region
North  -0.0280  0.0083  0.0010
Northeast  -0.2405  0.0054  0.0000
South  -0.0121  0.0058  0.0380
Center-West  0.0541  0.0067  0.0000
Cut-off points
1  -1.4363  0.0065
2  -1.2189  0.0062
3  -0.9484  0.0060
4  -0.6563  0.0058
5  -0.1847  0.0058
6  0.0110  0.0057
7  0.1627  0.0057
8  0.3162  0.0057
9  0.5968  0.0058
10  0.7002  0.0058
11  0.8144  0.0058
12  1.4831  0.0063
13  1.5423  0.0064
14  1.6095  0.0065
15  1.6978  0.0067
16  2.1622  0.0082
17  2.6981  0.0126
Source: PNAD/IBGE  1999  and author's calculationPolicy Research  Working  Paper Series
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